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Abstract
In recent years, the competition between B2C e-commerce 
platforms is increasing. From the perspective of consumer 
choice, with the application of system dynamics theory, 
and the analysis of the Causal relationship between the 
direct network externalities, indirect network externalities, 
compatibility and so on, the paper established system flow 
chart and system dynamics model of B2C e-commerce 
platform competition. Then using Vensim PLE to simulate 
the model and verified the effectiveness and application 
value of the model. The results showed that cost strategy 
that reduced cost of consumers’ online shopping and 
passed on part of the costs to the sellers, the marketing 
strategy that improved the marketing costs and perfected 
the products and services and the compatibility strategy 
that improved the compatibility with market leadership 
platform can effectively increase the market share of B2C 
e-commerce platform.
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INTRODUCTION
B2C, whose full name is Business to Customer, means 
that enterprises provide consumers with online shopping 
environment, and generally refers to online retail. Of the 
constantly emerging of the B2C e-commerce platform, the 
competition between platforms is increasing, which has 
become a prominent question in the network economy in 
our country.
B2C e-commerce is a holistic concept, whose members 
are various and relationship is complex. It has typical 
network structure and two-sided market characteristics 
and shows remarkable characteristics of network 
externalities, which profoundly affected the e-commerce 
platform. Many scholars analyzed the influence of 
network externalities on competition from the strategy 
of differentiation. Xu (2007) and Diao (2008) improved 
Hotelling model to describe the differentiation competition 
problem with network externality. Wen (2009) and Qu 
(2010) analyzed the influence of network externality 
from the degree of transfer cost. Due to industry maturity, 
more domestic scholars have paid close attention to the 
impact of network externalities on various industries, 
such as telecommunications (Sun & Pan, 2014), bank 
card industry (Cheng & Qiao, 2014) and e-commerce 
(Li, Zhong, & Xiong, 2014). Katz and Shapiro (1985) 
firstly confirmed that platforms competing with each other 
had the willing to be compatible with each other, but 
consumers’ different preferences and the differentiation 
competition of product/service would retain the diversity 
of the market.
At present, the research of B2C e-commerce platform 
lacks of dynamic research such as empirical research 
and simulation model, while more using the method of 
theoretical analysis and mathematical model for partial 
analysis. The competition of B2C e-commerce platform is 
a complex system process, and system dynamics can seek 
the related influencing factors from the whole system, 
then analyzing dynamic changes and causality relationship 
of the system and provides methods for the long-term 
competition of B2C e-commerce in a state of incomplete 
information.
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In the process of the online trading, consumers are the 
trading sponsors, the basic source of profit and the key 
of platform competition. This paper uses the method of 
system dynamics and establishes the simulation model 
based on consumer choice, revealing the competition laws 
and development of the factors. By adjusting the model 
parameters, it simulates the competition of market leader 
and follower, and provides competitive strategy for B2C 
e-commerce platform.
1.  CAUSALITY ANALYSIS OF B2C 
E-COMMERCE PLATFORM COMPETITION
This section will analyze the relationship between 
network externality and compatibility strategy, as well 
as the detailed classification of network externalities, and 
study the influence of above factors for consumers’ choice on 
the B2C e-commerce, then establish the causality analysis.
1.1 Causality Analysis of Network Externality, 
Compatibility and Platform Scale
The compatibility in Figure 1 refers to the compatibility 
degree of the competition platform for platform A, 
which is the key to the scale of platform A, and network 
externality depends on platform scale. As we can see, 
the main loop in this figure is positive feedback among 
network externality, compatibility and platform scale. The 
stronger the network externality of e-commerce platform 
is, the more utility it provides for consumers, more likely 
it may be compatible with other platform. The direct result 
of compatibility is to expand the scale of the platform, 
which forms a positive feedback to network externality.
Figure 1 
Causality Analysis of Network Externality, Compatibility 
and Platform Scale
1.2 Causality Analysis of the Impact of Direct and 
Indirect Network Externality on Consumer Choice
Figure 2 describes two positive feedback loops which are 
loop 1 and loop 2, including the direct network externality 
with consumer growth and indirect network externality 
with platform merchant growth, and the positive feedback 
relationship between the above two externality utility and 
consumer growth. In loop 1, consumer growth and the 
total number of non-online shopping consumer determine 
consumer scale. The more consumers, the more direct 
externality, the more the brand impact of the platform can be 
enhanced, thus to enhance consumer utility and attract more 
consumers, so the feedback loop completed. The principle of 
loop 2 is similar to loop 1 and is not be analyzed separately.
Figure 2
Causality Analysis of the Impact of Direct and Indirect Network Externality on Consumer Choice
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2.  SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL OF 
B 2 C  E - C O M M E R C E  P L AT F O R M 
COMPETITION
2.1 The Main Model Equations
The model equations include consumer and merchant 
scale expansion.
2.1.1 Consumer Scale Expansion
Consumer scale of platform A=INTEG (Consumer growth 
speed of platform A, 5).
Consumer growth speed of the platform A= (total 
number of non-online shopping consumer of base 
period- Consumer scale of platform A- Consumer scale 
of competition platform)* Consumer growth rate of 
platform A.
Consumer growth rate of platform A=Online shopping 
costs of platform A*shopping costs impact factor*cost-
utility conversion ratio+ (online shopping utility of 
platform A +direct externality utility of platform A 
+indirect externality utility of platform A)*online 
shopping utility impact factor +online shopping 
awareness* online shopping awareness impact factor.
Brand impact of platform A = (0.25* direct externality 
uti l i ty of platform A+0.65* indirect  externali ty 
utility of platform A)/3+SMOOTH (brand marketing 
investment*investment conversion factor, 5).
Compatibility coefficient=SMOOTH3I (Brand impact 
of platform A, 15, 0.05).
2.1.2 The Merchant Scale Expansion
Merchant scale of platform A=INTEG (Merchant growth 
speed of platform A, 6).
Merchant growth speed of platform A= (0.6* total 
number of non-platform merchant of base period- 
merchant scale of platform A)* merchant growth rate of 
platform A.
Merchant growth rate of platform A=merchant costs 
of platform A*merchant costs impact factor* cost-
utility conversion ratio+ merchant utility of platform A+ 
merchant utility impact factor.
2.2 System Flow of B2C E-Commerce Platform 
Competition
Based on the above analysis, the system flow of B2C 
e-commerce platform competition based on consumer 
choice showed as Figure 3.
Figure 3
System Flow of B2C E-Commerce Platform Competition
2.3 Model Validation
Compared with domestic online shopping consumer 
scale, the model validation was tested. Since the 
simulation model aimed at platform consumer scale, 
unlike the domestic online shopping scale. Therefore, the 
comparative analysis is not the comparison of absolute 
amount of data, but the comparison of trends and laws of 
the market.
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Figure 4 
2007-2014 Online-shopping Consumer Scale
Data source: CNNIC China Internet Development Statistics Report.
Figure 5
Initial Eight-Year Consumer Scale of Platform A by 
the Simulation Model
Data source: CNNIC China Internet Development Statistics Report.
Figure 4 is the trend of online shopping scale during 
2007-2014. Figure 5 is the trend of the first eight years 
of consumer scale of the B2C e-commerce platform 
competition that the simulation model simulated. From the 
comparison of Figures 4 and 5, the trend of the real data 
and simulation results are basically the same. Therefore, 
the model is valid.
3. COMPETITIVE STRATEGY ANALYSIS
In recent years, the competition between e-commerce 
platforms is more and more fierce, and each platform 
hope to take the most effective strategy to devour other’s 
market share to achieve sustainable growth. This part 
based on the B2C e-commerce platform competition 
platform model, considered the effect of B2C e-commerce 
platform competition strategy from reducing costs, 
strengthening marketing and compatibility strategy of 
competition platform.
3.1 Cost Strategy
Reducing online shopping costs is the most direct and 
effective way to attract potential customers. We adjusted 
the simulation model of online shopping costs (6% 
reduction) and business costs (4% increase) parameters, 
and the main output is in Figure 6.
As can be seen from the figure, under the cost strategy, 
customer scale of platform A improves greatly because 
it depredates part of customers of competition platform, 
which also significantly improves the direct network 
externality utility and brand impact of platform A and 
therefore, improves the compatibility of competition 
platform to platform A. Due to merchants’ costs improve, 
the merchants scale has a slight decrease, resulting 
the indirect network externality utility decreases 
slightly.
Therefore, the strategy of reducing online shopping 
costs will help expand the market and maintain the leading 
position. Though it will face the loss of some merchants, 
the platform can choose to pass the increasing operation 
costs to merchants as long as the loss is not too much, 
which can effectively control the platform operation costs 
and improves its profitability.
3.2 Marketing Strategy
Marketing is the most common strategy that B2C 
e-commerce platform takes in order to enhance brand 
impact. We adjusted the model of brand marketing input 
(five times), and the output is in Figure 7.
As can be seen from the figure, under the marketing 
strategy, the customer scale of platform A has a strong 
growth in a period, but it has a slight increase in the 
balance state than the reference state, because the 
platform focuses only on marketing input, and ignores 
the substantial improvement on products and service. 
Merchants are also affected by the marketing strategy 
and tend to choose products and service of platform A. 
Because of the increase of consumers and merchants 
scale, the direct and indirect network externality utility 
improve to different extents. The increase input in brand 
marketing input improves the brand impact of platform 
A and prompts the compatibility of competition platform, 
which brings consumer scale of competition platform 
grows in a short time, but the real benefit is the platform 
that implemented the marketing strategy. Therefore, in the 
long run, the competition platform will lose its customers, 
so its consumer scale will be less than the reference.
In summary, the marketing strategy enables the 
platform to take a large accumulation of popularity in 
the short term and attract potential customers to join the 
platform. But the platform also should pay attention to 
timely ancillary products and service to meet the rapidly 
growing consumer demand and maintain rapid and stable 
development and the industry leader status.
3.3 Compatibility Strategy
Compatibility strategy is taken by competition platform 
as a market follower to compete for market. In the 
simulation model, we set platform A as the leader, and 
the competition platform as follower, and adjusted the 
compatibility of competition platform to platform A 
(increased by 10%). The simulation output is in Figure 8.
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Figure 6 
Comparison of Cost Strategy Simulation Results
Figure 7
Comparison of Marketing Strategy Simulation Results
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As can be seen from the figure, under the compatibility 
strategy, the consumer scale of competition platform has 
a strong growth and consumer scale of platform A has a 
slight increase at the beginning. Because the improvement 
of compatibility of competition platform improves the 
direct network externality utility of platform A and brand 
impact. But the improvement of the compatibility of 
competition platform gives customers more products 
and service, which are bound to attract part of potential 
customers of platform A. So the consumer scale of 
platform A will be lower than the reference scale lately. 
The compatibility strategy of competition platform has 
little effect on merchants on platform A and naturally has 
no significant impact on the indirect network externality 
utility of platform A.
In summary, if the competition platform improves 
its compatibility with leading platform, it will increase 
its market share significantly. Though the compatibility 
of following platform in the short run can bring 
market growth to some extent, it will face the loss 
of consumers in the long term, the leading platform 
should watch out for such a competitive strategy. 
Therefore, B2C e-commerce platform should properly 
handle the compatibility strategy that other platform 
proposed, and avoid long-term interests at the expense of 
short-sighted.
Figure 8
Comparison of Compatibility Strategy Simulation Results
CONCLUSION
In recent years, B2C e-commerce platform has entered the 
competitive stage. This article applies system dynamics 
to study the competition strategy of B2C e-commerce 
platform. Based on the analysis on the causality analysis 
on factors like direct and indirect network externality 
and compatibility, we establish the system flow of B2C 
e-commerce platform competition and system dynamics 
model that show the relationship between variables, 
and adjust parameters to dynamically simulate. The 
results show that strategies including reducing online 
shopping costs while increase merchants costs, taking 
marketing strategy through online and offline channels 
to popularize, promote, advertise while improving 
products and service, market follower improving 
compatibility with leading platform while market leading 
platform properly handling the compatibility proposal 
that put forward by other platform, can improve the 
market share of B2C e-commerce platform. Therefore, 
different B2C e-commerce platform can take different 
competition strategy according to their position in the 
market.
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